



Stakeholder Knowledge and Behavioral Integration in Boards of Social 




The social entrepreneurship literature increasingly acknowledges that the board of directors is of 
major importance in dealing with the specific tensions that social enterprises face. Using a team 
production perspective, we argue that the extent to which board members possess relevant 
knowledge about stakeholder groups, enhances the engagement of the board in counseling and 
decision-making (i.e. board service performance). Furthermore, we expect that such engagement 
is positively related to organizational performance, which is multifaceted, in line with the hybrid 
nature of social enterprises. Finally, we investigate the contingency factors under which board 
stakeholder knowledge relates to board service performance and subsequent organizational 
performance. Particularly, we claim that such knowledge is especially relevant in cases of strong 
behavioral integration among board members. Using a sample of Flemish social enterprises, we 
find that board stakeholder knowledge is positively related to board service performance. This 
relationship is further moderated by strong board behavioral integration, which is strengthening the 
relationship in cases of high stakeholder knowledge, but has a mitigating effect in cases of low 
stakeholder knowledge. Finally, while board service performance is positively related to the social 
goal of hiring disadvantaged people, it is not significantly related to financial performance. 
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Social enterprises are described as hybrid organizations as they pursue a dual mission of creating 
social value as well as being financially sustainable (Doherty et al., 2014; Pache and Santos, 2013). 
As such, they combine the creation of social value, associated with the non-profit sector, with 
traditional business approaches, associated with for-profit organizations (Wilson and Post, 2013). 
Specifically, social enterprises aim at fulfilling ‘wicked problems’, such as social exclusion or 
poverty (Dacin et al., 2010; Mair et al., 2012; Santos, 2012). The combining and balancing of social 
and financial goals in decision-making is described as a major internal challenge in social 
enterprises (Battilana and Lee, 2014).  Particularly, some authors have commented on the erosion 
of social goals in favor of financial performance ((Doherty et al., 2014), whereas others have 
documented the reverse situation in which the overemphasis of social goals and the neglect of 
financial goals lead to business failure (Cornforth, 2014; Tracey et al., 2011). While a number of 
causes for the origination of such goal imbalance have been articulated in the literature (Cornforth, 
2014; Jones, 2007), a high level of dependence on a single or a limited number of stakeholders in 
the external environment is frequently mentioned as one of the core reasons for its occurrence 
(Bennett and Savani, 2011). Indeed, social enterprises often lack a dominant stakeholder and face 
the challenge of aligning the interests of a wide range of stakeholders such as the beneficiaries of 
their social mission, their customers, funders and governments (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Pache and 
Santos, 2010). In such circumstances, stakeholders may have conflicting expectations and 
demands, and social enterprises may  have to decide which demands they prioritize on (Ebrahim 
et al., 2014). 
Corporate governance mechanisms in general and the board of directors in particular are considered 




Ebrahim et al., 2014; Mair et al., 2015; Pache and Santos, 2013; Spear et al., 2009). Boards in 
social enterprises can contribute in a number of ways. First, boards may serve as a connection 
between the social enterprise and its stakeholders in the external environment (Ebrahim et al., 
2014). Moreover, through their understanding of the interests and expectations of external 
stakeholders, board members may play a major role in securing stakeholder support as well as in 
identifying risks and opportunities in the external environment (Doherty et al., 2014; Ebrahim et 
al., 2014). This will help the board to balance potential tensions between the social and financial 
goals in decision-making (Cornforth, 2014; Pestoff and Hulgård, 2015). This is because boards do 
not only engage in a control role, but are also active in their service role, through which they engage 
in advice giving and strategic decision making (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2000; 
Minichilli et al., 2009). Accordingly, it is through the engagement in their service role (which we 
refer to, in line with Minichilli et al. (2009) and Crucke and Knockaert (2016), as ‘board service 
performance’) that boards contribute to the safeguarding of the social and financial mission and 
performance of social enterprises.  
Therefore, in this paper, using a team production perspective, we specifically study the relationship 
between stakeholder knowledge in the board and board service performance, and the extent to 
which this board service performance is positively related to organizational performance. In doing 
so, we also investigate the circumstances under which these relationships become weaker or 
stronger. Particularly, we argue that boards will be particularly contributing in case they actively 
work together as a team and use their knowledge on external stakeholder groups.  As such, in 
considering the relationship between board stakeholder knowledge and board service performance, 
we study the influence of behavioral integration. Behavioral integration is a concept introduced by 
Hambrick (1994), measuring the tendency of groups, such as boards, to engage in more teamlike 




In studying the relationship between board stakeholder knowledge, board service performance and 
organizational performance alongside its contingency factors, we contribute to the social 
entrepreneurship and corporate governance literatures in a number of ways. First, we contribute to 
the social entrepreneurship literature by providing an understanding into how social enterprises 
internally deal with the specific tensions related to their hybrid nature (Pache and Santos, 2010). 
Importantly, while the board of directors is expected to be an important mechanism in dealing with 
such tensions, the governance mechanism has so far received surprisingly little attention in social 
entrepreneurship research (Ebrahim et al., 2014). As such, this paper responds to calls to study the 
governance function in social enterprises (Doherty et al., 2014; Mair et al., 2015). We further add 
to the social enterprise literature by studying financial and social performance in conjunction. 
While there is a consensus that social enterprises should be evaluated by considering financial and 
non-financial performance simultaneously (Austin et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2013), there is a dearth 
of research that does so (Battilana et al., 2015; Coombes et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2014). Second, we 
contribute to the corporate governance literature. While board service performance has recently 
received considerable interest, studies have so far mainly focused on understanding the antecedents 
of board service performance (Knockaert et al., 2015; Minichilli et al., 2009). Only few studies 
have examined the relationship between board service performance and organizational 
performance. Importantly, studies that focused on the latter relationship have typically focused on 
financial performance (Minichilli et al., 2012; Westphal, 1999; Zattoni et al., 2015). As such, we 
aim at contributing to this literature by studying the relationship between board service 
performance and organizational performance as a multidimensional construct.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present our theoretical framework 
building on team production theory. Subsequently, we describe the research method, including the 




The article concludes with the discussion of main conclusions and contributions, as well as the 
limitations and directions for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Board stakeholder knowledge and board service performance: a team production 
perspective 
Team production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999; Kaufman and Englander, 2005) is particularly 
relevant for our research objectives as it focuses on stakeholder groups and is instrumental in 
understanding the mediating role of the board of directors.  First, team production theory can be 
considered as a reaction to agency theory and its logic of shareholder primacy (Aguilera et al., 
2015). According to team production theory, an organization embodies several stakeholder groups, 
including shareholders and non-shareholder groups such as employees, creditors, local 
governments, suppliers and consumers, who collectively make contributions in order to make an 
organization successful (Lan and Heracleous, 2010). This is certainly the case for social enterprises, 
which are particularly exposed to diverging expectations by different stakeholder groups (Battilana 
and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2010). Second, in team production theory, the board of 
directors is assigned the role of ‘mediating hierarch’ and central decision making body of the 
organization (Heracleous and Lan, 2012). From this perspective, the main function of the board is 
no longer the monitoring function aimed at reducing agency costs. Instead, the board has to balance 
potentially competing stakeholder expectations and interests (Aguilera et al., 2015). A main 
challenge of the board is to take decisions in the best interest of the organization while meeting the 
needs of various stakeholders, such that stakeholder groups are satisfied and are willing to continue 




also particularly relevant for social enterprises in which the balancing of the often competing 
demands of several stakeholder groups is crucial. Indeed, in cases of diverging stakeholder 
expectations, multi-stakeholder governance is considered a good practice (Cornforth and Spear, 
2010; Spear et al., 2009). Particularly, Kaufman and Englander (2005) argue that, in order to fulfill 
its mediating role properly, the board should reflect stakeholder groups. In other words, the board 
must have board members, who have knowledge about one or several stakeholder groups and their 
interests. Such knowledge will help board members in identifying risks and opportunities in the 
external environment, which is important for adequate advice giving and decision-making in 
consideration of the needs and expectations of different stakeholder groups (Doherty et al., 2014; 
Ebrahim et al., 2014; Gabrielsson et al., 2007; Huybrechts et al., 2014). Based on these arguments, 
we argue that boards of social enterprises with higher levels of stakeholder knowledge will be better 
able to engage in their service role, and thus reach higher board service performance. Subsequently, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Board stakeholder knowledge is positively related to board service performance. 
 
Board service performance and organizational performance 
When boards engage in their service role, they are expected to contribute to the maximization of 
value creation (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Minichilli et al., 2012). 
Indeed, it has been argued that, as board members provide qualified advice and participate in 
decision-making, they enhance organizational performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman 
et al., 2009). This is in line with team production theory, indicating that boards contribute 




same time, only a limited number of studies have examined the relationship between board service 
performance and organizational performance, and those that did, focused exclusively on financial 
performance (Minichilli et al., 2012; Westphal, 1999; Zattoni et al., 2015). However, as 
performance is a multi-dimensional construct, and diverse dimensions deserve attention, 
particularly in a social entrepreneurship context, we need to consider social performance alongside 
financial performance (Austin et al., 2006; Battilana et al., 2015). This is because several scholars 
have argued that boards may play an important role in overseeing the creation of social value 
alongside the achievement of financial sustainability (Doherty et al., 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014). 
Through their engagement in the service role, boards can balance the social and financial goals in 
giving advice and engaging in strategic decision-making. As such, in line with team production 
theory, and considering the multi-dimensional nature of performance, we argue that there will be a 
positive relationship between board service performance and social and financial performance. In 
studying social performance, we then consider two primary social goals of social enterprises, 
namely hiring disadvantaged people and engaging in community responsibilities (Cornforth and 
Spear, 2010; Spear and Bidet, 2005). By consequence, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a. Board service performance is positively related to hiring disadvantaged people. 
Hypothesis 2b. Board service performance is positively related to engaging in community 
responsibilities. 
Hypothesis 2c. Board service performance is positively related to financial performance. 
 
Behavioral integration as a contingency factor  
The corporate governance literature emphasizes the importance of behavioral aspects and internal 




Along the same lines, team production theory emphasizes the importance of cooperation in the 
board; it considers the board as a cooperative team in which performance increases as board 
members interact with each other (Kaufman and Englander, 2005). More specifically, the theory 
argues that internal processes are crucial in order to actively use the knowledge and expertise of 
board members. Each board member brings relevant knowledge to the board. However, there is no 
single board member who has, on his or her own, all the information and knowledge necessary to 
take adequate decisions. It is through the interaction between the board members that boards 
become more effective in terms of counseling and decision-making (Gabrielsson et al., 2007; 
Machold et al., 2011). This is in line with the concept of ‘behavioral integration’ defined as ‘the 
degree to which mutual and collective action exists within the group’ and assessing the teamlike 
behavior of groups, such as boards (Li and Hambrick, 2005).  By consequence, behaviorally 
integrated boards, are characterized by a higher quality and quantity of information exchange 
(Lubatkin et al., 2006). As such, behavioral integration enables boards to better use available 
knowledge (Machold et al., 2011) and enhances counseling and decision making within the board 
(Li and Hambrick, 2005). While bringing stakeholder knowledge to the firm is important, we argue 
that this is particularly the case when behavioral integration allows this knowledge to be shared 
and applied. Building on these arguments, we contend that behavioral integration in the board will 
enhance the positive effect of board stakeholder knowledge on board service performance. We 
offer the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between board stakeholder knowledge and board service 





Our conceptual model is presented in Figure 1. 
--------------------------------------------- 





Research setting and sample 
Although entrepreneurs and organizations aiming for social value creation have always existed, 
studies on social entrepreneurship have only recently emerged (Bacq and Janssen, 2011). 
Furthermore, the conceptualization of social entrepreneurship and its development has widely 
differed between the US and Europe, with very few connections until the years 2004-2005 
(Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). In Europe, social enterprises mainly emerged because of the 
persistence of high rates of unemployment during the 1980s and the increasing exclusion of 
vulnerable groups from the labor market and society. Instead of relying only on passive labor 
market policies, authorities have started to encourage and develop active labor policies (Defourny 
and Nyssens, 2010). By consequence, social enterprises were set up to reintegrate people in society 
by offering them a job, while simultaneously providing job training and social support (Battilana 
et al., 2015; Pache and Santos, 2010). As a consequence ‘Work integration social enterprises’ 
(WISEs) are the dominant type of social enterprises in Europe (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008). This 
is also the case in Belgium, the country in which this study is conducted. However, there is a 
growing awareness, also among policy makers, that entrepreneurship with social aims goes beyond 
work integration. Indeed, more organizations offering entrepreneurial, innovative responses to 




from those of WISEs, they are often still concerned about the integration of vulnerable people. As 
such, also these social enterprises frequently provide jobs with the aim of work integration 
(Siqueira et al., 2018). 
Our sample consists of social enterprises in Flanders, one of the regions of Belgium. The data were 
collected as part of a research project with support of the Flemish government, which provided the 
names and contact information of Flemish social enterprises. In line with the above discussion, the 
following organizations were included as social enterprises: (1) sheltered workshops and social 
workshops, established with the main purpose of reintegrating job seekers who face difficulties to 
find a job in the regular job market because of physical, social or psychological problems, mainly 
operating in packaging, assembly, gardening, recycling, and printing (Battilana et al., 2015), (2) 
work experience enterprises and work care initiatives, offering a job to long-term unemployed 
people and mainly active in health and social care or the cultural sector (Van Opstal et al., 2009), 
(3) work integration enterprises employing long-term unemployed jobseekers and integrating them 
into their regular staff (Van Opstal et al., 2009) and (4) cooperatives: member-based democratic 
organizations (Spear, 2004). 
 
Data collection 
In order to reach our research objectives, we combine primary data obtained from an online 
questionnaire as well as secondary data available in the public database Belfirst.  
First, a survey was administered, comprising questions on general company information, board 
dynamics and board tasks, as well as on the functioning and (non-financial) performance of the 
social enterprises. The questionnaire was distributed in 2014 to the CEOs of all 812 Flemish social 




mail and telephone), a total of 199 CEOs completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 25%. 
Second, the survey data were matched with the secondary data obtained from Belfirst, which is 
relatively straightforward as each enterprise has a unique firm identifier (i.e. the enterprise’s Value 
Added Tax code). Belfirst contains information on annual accounting information of all Belgian 
enterprises. The Belfirst database is compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BvD)—one of Europe’s leading 
electronic publishers of business information. When the financial statements are filed with the 
National Bank of Belgium, they are processed and checked and subsequently made available to the 
public. BvD collects these data to compile the Belfirst database. Because of missing financial data 
in Belfirst, our final dataset comprises 182 social enterprises. 
 
Measures 
Dependent and mediator variables   
Board service performance. Board service performance is measured using 8 items of the scale 
developed by Minichilli et al. (2009) and is incorporating the advice giving and strategic 
participation of the board service role (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2005). Respondents were 
asked to indicate on a seven-point Likert scale (ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly 
agree) to what extent the board fulfills its service role. Specifically, we asked respondents to 
indicate the degree to agreement with the following items: The board (1) provides advice on 
management issues; (2) provides advice on financial issues; (3) provides advice on technical issues; 
(4) provides advice on market issues; (5) provides advice on legal issues; (6) is involved in 
promoting strategic initiatives; (7) is involved in taking strategic decisions; and (8) is involved in 
participating in the implementation phase of long-term strategic decision-making.  
Hiring disadvantaged people. The degree to which social enterprises engage in hiring 




disadvantaged people was then assessed using a seven-point Likert scale through which 
respondents indicated their agreement with the following statements: (1: strongly disagree; 7: 
strongly agree): (1) Our organization actively hires immigrants, (2) Our organization actively hires 
low skilled people, (3) Our organization actively hires elderly people, (4) Our organization actively 
hires long term unemployed people and (5) Our organization actively hires disabled people. 
Community responsibilities. To measure the degree to which social enterprises incorporate 
community responsibilities, we used the scale developed by Crucke and Decramer (2016). 
Community responsibilities was assessed using a seven-point Likert scale through which 
respondents indicated their agreement with the following statements (1: strongly disagree; 7: 
strongly agree): (1) Our organization informs the local community by organizing presentations, 
company visits,…, (2) Our organization offers traineeships to students, (3) Our organization offers 
products and/or services to vulnerable people, (4) Our organization addresses unsolved societal 
problems, (5) Our organization pursues partnerships with governments, for profit organizations, 
social economy organizations, labor agencies and other community organizations.  
Financial performance. In line with previous research studying social enterprises (Stevens et al., 
2015) and the impact of boards on organizational performance (Payne et al., 2009; Zattoni et al., 
2015), we used return on assets (ROA) to assess financial performance. Specifically, we measured 
financial performance by calculating the mean of ROA 2014 and ROA 2015. As the measure is 
prone to outliers, we winsorized this variable in order to convert it outliers into its 5th or 95th 
percentiles (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2011). Information for the calculation of this variable 






Independent variables   
Board stakeholder knowledge. In order to measure this independent variable, we used the measure 
developed by Kim and Cannella (2008), focusing on the knowledge of  board members about 
several stakeholder groups and industries. As we perform our study in the context of social 
enterprises, we added one item (item 4 below) to the measure, in order to also capture the 
knowledge of the board on important social organizations. Specifically, the respondents were asked 
to indicate on an seven-point Likert scale (ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree), 
the degree to which they agreed with the following statements: (1) The board appoints lead outside 
directors, (2) The board has members who know important financing institutions, (3) The board 
has members who know important customers of the organization, (4) The board has members who 
know important social (nonprofit) organizations, (5) The board has members who know important 
suppliers of the organization (6) The board consists of members with diverse industry/ sector 
backgrounds.   
 
Behavioral integration. Behavioral integration is measured using the measure of Li and Hambrick 
(2005). The respondents were asked to indicate on an seven-point Likert scale (ranging from 1: 
strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree), the degree to which they agreed with the following 
statements: (1) All the directors have a voice in major decisions affecting the organization, (2) 
Communications among directors can be best described as open and fluid, (3) When major 
decisions are made affecting the organization, the directors collectively exchange their points of 








We further added control variables at board and firm level that may affect board service 
performance (Minichilli et al., 2012; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). At board level, we control for the 
frequency of board meetings, as the frequency of board meetings is likely to affect board service 
performance (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013). Further, as each board member may bring different 
linkages and resources to the board, also board size is expected to influence board service 
performance and is thus controlled for (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013; Minichilli et al., 2009). 
At the organizational level, we controlled for age and size of the organization as the need for advice 
and establishing legitimacy by board members may vary between young and old, and small and 
large organizations (Knockaert et al., 2015; Minichilli et al., 2012). Furthermore, age and size are 
typically considered important drivers of organizational performance (Wiklund and Shepherd, 
2005), which also holds for social enterprises (Liu et al., 2014; Weerawardena and Mort, 2012). 
The size of the organization is operationalized as the number of employees, obtained from the 
public database Belfirst. The organization’s age is obtained by using the date of incorporation 





To test our theoretical model, we applied Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-
SEM; also referred to as PLS path modeling), using the SmartPLS 3 package (Hair et al., 2017). 
The following features make PLS-SEM particularly appropriate for our study. First, PLS-SEM 
allows to model latent variables and to simultaneously assess both measurement and structural 
models. This implies that PLS-SEM enables to test the validity of the constructs used and to assess 




sample size and residual distributions. While covariance-based SEM recommends sample sizes 
ranging from 200 to 800 (Bandalos, 1997; Marsh et al., 1998), PLS-SEM has the advantage that it 
achieves robustness and statistical power in the case of smaller sample sizes (Sarstedt et al., 2014). 
Moreover, PLS-SEM allows the use of models with many constructs and indicators (items), while 
covariance-based SEM recommends that the number of indicators should be limited in the case of 
small sample sizes, which is particularly challenging in research using lengthy ordinal scales (Yang 
et al., 2010).  
We follow the commonly used two-stage procedure as proposed by Hair et al. (2017). In a first 
step, the PLS-SEM results of the measurement model are assessed to evaluate the reliability, the 
convergent validity and the discriminant validity of the individual constructs. In a second step, the 
PLS-SEM results of the structural model are assessed to test the hypothesized relationships 
between the variables. As suggested by Hair et al. (2017), we first run the model without moderator 
to test for hypothesis 1. Subsequently, we run the model adding the moderator in order to assess 
hypothesis 3.  
 
Measurement model, descriptive statistics and correlations 
In a first step, we assess the reliability and validity of the individual constructs by evaluating the 
reflective measurement model, presented in Table I. We apply the following general expected 
thresholds to assess, respectively, indicator reliability, internal consistency reliability and 
convergent validity: (1) indicator’s outer loadings should preferably be higher than 0.7, (2) 
composite reliability (CR) and Cronbach’s alpha should be higher than 0.6, (3) Average Variance 




To assess the indicator reliability, we first study the size and the significance of the outer loadings 
of the items. Two items (item 6 of ‘Board stakeholder knowledge’ and item 5 of ‘Hiring 
disadvantaged people’) are eliminated from their construct as their outer loading is very low 
(<0.40) and not statistically significant (Hair et al., 2017). Consequently, we study the items with 
outer loadings between 0.40 and 0.70. In order to increase the value of the AVE and CR above the 
threshold value, we eliminated two more items (item 4 of ‘Board stakeholder knowledge’ and item 
2 of ‘Community responsibilities’). Table 1 gives an overview of the outer loadings of the items, 
the composite reliability (CR) and the average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct. Table 
I indicates that the constructs have acceptable internal consistency reliability as all CR scores are 
higher than 0.7. The fact that all constructs have an AVE exceeding the threshold of 0.5 indicates 
convergent validity.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table I about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
We finally assess the discriminant validity of the constructs by studying the Heterotrait-Monotrait 
Ratio (HTMT). All HTMT values are lower than the threshold of 0.85 and neither of the confidence 
intervals includes the value 1, supporting discriminant validity. 
Table II provides the means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table II about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
None of the correlations exceeds 0.8, indicating that multicollinearity is not likely to affect our 






The structural model is used to test for the hypothesized relationships between the latent variables. 
We assess the strength and significance of the path coefficients, applying a bootstrapping procedure 
with 5,000 bootstrap samples. Table III gives an overview of the results of the structural model.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table III about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
We first consider Model 1 (the full model without the moderator). The path coefficients show that 
board stakeholder knowledge has a significant positive effect (0.433, p < 0.001) on board service 
performance, supporting Hypothesis 1. In addition, board service performance (0.155, p< 0.05) is 
significantly positively related to ‘hiring disadvantage people’, supporting hypothesis 2a.  
Hypotheses 2b and 2c are not supported as we find a non-statistically significant coefficient. 
Subsequently, we assess model 2 with behavioral integration as a moderating variable. In line with 
Aguinis et al. (2011), we use the 10%-significance level as an appropriate cut-off point for 
assessing interaction effects. Our results support hypothesis 3 as we find that there is a significant, 
positive moderating effect of behavioral integration (0.174, p < 0.10).  
Some of the control variables in Models 1 and 2 also point to interesting additional relationships. 
Particularly, the number of board meetings and organization age are positively related to board 
service performance. Organizational age further has a negative effect on hiring disadvantage 
people.  
In order to interpret the significant interaction between board stakeholder knowledge and 
behavioral integration in explaining board service performance, we visualize the interaction in 




knowledge is steeper for organizations with higher levels of behavioral integration. The figure also 
indicates that increasing levels of behavioral integration only strengthen board service performance 
if the standardized value of board stakeholder knowledge is higher than 0.25. A standardized value 
of 0.25 corresponds to a value on the Likert scale of the mean added with 0.25*standard deviation, 
or 4.34 (= 4.02 + 0.25*1.28 = 4.34). If board stakeholder knowledge is lower, higher levels of 
behavioral integration even mitigate board service performance. This finding indicates that it is of 
little relevance to establish a board with high levels of behavioral integration, if that board does not 
possess knowledge on the organization’s stakeholders.  
 
--------------------------------------------- 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In the social entrepreneurship literature, a consensus is emerging that the board of directors is of 
major importance to deal with the specific tensions social enterprises, as hybrid organizations, face 
(Doherty et al., 2014). Boards have the ultimate responsibility to balance the social and financial 
goals in decision-making to ensure financial viability as well as the achievement of the social 
mission (Cornforth, 2014). Social enterprises lack a dominant stakeholder, instead they are 
accountable to multiple principal stakeholders with diverging interest, such as the beneficiaries of 
the social mission, clients and governments (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Social enterprises are expected 
to be better able to deal with the diverging expectations of stakeholders when relevant knowledge 




taking in consideration stakeholder expectations is in line with the democratic and participatory 
values that typify social enterprises (Pestoff and Hulgård, 2015).  
In this paper, we took a team production perspective to study how stakeholder knowledge is 
instrumental in helping boards to fulfill their service role, subsequently influencing organizational 
performance. Furthermore, as it is commonly accepted that boards function better if they act as  
teams (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003), we also study board behavioral integration, referring to the 
teamlike behavior of boards. 
The results of our study of boards in Flemish social enterprises indicate that board stakeholder 
knowledge is positively related to board service performance. Our study further assessed whether 
board service performance is related to organizational outcomes. In doing so, we followed the 
recommendation to study  both financial as well as social performance in social enterprises (Austin 
et al., 2006). The results of our study indicate that board service performance is positively related 
to the social goal of hiring disadvantaged people. However, we did not find support for a positive 
relationship between board service performance and financial performance. This is line with the 
results of the study by Coombes et al. (2011), who studied the impact of behavioral aspects of 
social enterprise boards on entrepreneurial orientation and subsequently on financial and social 
performance. A possible explanation can be found in the paper of Pache and Santos (2013), 
studying how social enterprises deal internally with the conflicting demands they are exposed to. 
The authors discuss one particular pattern of managing internal tensions, which they refer to as 
‘Trojan horse’. It means that internal actors related to stakeholder groups representing commercial 
goals, choose to enact practices sustaining the social goals to compensate for the lack of legitimacy 
in the social enterprise context because of their affiliation with commercially oriented 
organizations. Although the scope in the study of Pache and Santos (2013) is different as they study 




may possibly also explain the extent to which board member behavior in the service role relates to 
financial performance. Furthermore, our study indicates that behavioral integration in the board is 
an important factor in strengthening board service performance, particularly if the board has 
sufficient knowledge on the organization’s stakeholders.  
 
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it contributes to the social 
entrepreneurship literature, which has largely neglected to provide insights into the governance 
function in social enterprises (Mair et al., 2015), and how this governance function can help social 
enterprises to deal with the challenges they are confronted with. Indeed, whereas social enterprise 
scholars have advocated the integration of stakeholder expectations in social enterprise governance 
in line with the democratic and participatory values social enterprise subscribe (Huybrechts et al., 
2014; Pestoff and Hulgård, 2015), we currently have few insights into how such integration can 
benefit the social enterprise. Particularly, our study points to the importance of boards possessing 
relevant knowledge on stakeholder groups, resulting in a stronger engagement by the board in its 
service role. As we further show, such engagement is particularly important in order for social 
enterprises to reach the social goal of hiring disadvantaged people. Second, through analyzing 
which board characteristics affect board service performance and subsequent organizational 
performance under which conditions, our study is of interest to both the social entrepreneurship 
and corporate governance literatures. While most studies have either focused on the link between 
board characteristics and board service performance, or on the relationship between board service 
performance and financial performance, to our knowledge, only few studies have provided a more 
holistic picture by uniting these elements (Zattoni et al., 2015). In doing so, our study also 
acknowledges that performance is a multi-dimensional construct, and unites social and financial 




integration for board service performance, and as such contribute to calls in the corporate 
governance literature to gain deeper insights into the role of board cohesiveness (Finkelstein and 
Mooney, 2003; Huse et al., 2011). 
Our study also has implications for practitioners, such as CEOs of social enterprises and their 
stakeholders. First, it reveals that social enterprises can expect to have boards that engage more 
actively in their service role, if they possess strong knowledge on the different stakeholder groups. 
This is particularly the case if these boards also have strong levels of behavioral integration. In 
accordance with Lubatkin et al. (2006), denoting the role of CEOs in strengthening behavioral 
integration within top management teams, we point to the pivotal role of the board chair in 
selecting, evaluating and motivating board members in order to reach behavioral integration. 
Second, practitioners may benefit from understanding the relationship between a stronger 
engagement by the board in its service role and organizational performance, in which our results 
point to a strong relationship between this engagement and one of the social goals, namely the 
hiring of disadvantaged people.   
Our study also has some limitations, which have implications for the interpretations of our findings 
and for future research. First, our study uses a cross-sectional design. While we built our arguments 
and the directions of these arguments in line with team production theory, we are unable to make 
strong claims on the direction of the relationships. Longitudinal studies may provide additional 
insights into how board composition contributes to board performance and subsequent 
organizational performance (Machold and Farquhar, 2013). Additionally, qualitative studies may 
contribute in gaining additional insights in how stakeholder knowledge shapes board dynamics and 
board decisions (Sundaramurthy et al., 2014). Second, our study was executed in a particular 
context, namely that of Flemish social enterprises. While we do not have reasons to believe that 




relationship between board stakeholder knowledge, board service performance and organizational 
performance in other contexts, where other definitions of social entrepreneurship apply (e.g. the 
US), or where corporate governance laws differ. Third, while our study specifically points to the 
importance of board behavioral integration for board service performance, it does not study the 
antecedents of such behavioral integration. Future research could as such purposefully study the 
relationship between board member characteristics (e.g. human capital), board characteristics (e.g. 
board cohesion), board evaluation and development practices (Gill et al., 2005; Kiel and Nicholson, 
2005), board chair characteristics (e.g. leadership and communication style) (Harrison and Murray, 
2012), and interaction patterns in building teamlike behavior within boards.  
 Despite these limitations, this study contributed by shedding light on the understudied 
corporate governance function in social enterprises, hereby particularly focusing on the relationship 
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FIGURE  1 
Conceptual model 
  





Reflective measurement model  
 
  
            
    Loading AVE CR  Cronbach's α 
Board Service Performance Item 1 0.790 0,623 0,929 0,912 
 Item 2 0.842    
 Item 3 0.797    
 Item 4 0.769    
 Item 5 0.813    
 Item 6 0.729    
 Item 7 0.757    
 Item 8 0.795    
      
Board Stakeholder Knowledge Item 1 0.764 0,502 0,801 0,698 
 Item 2 0.643    
 Item 3 0.727    
 Item 4 0.693    
      
Hiring disadvantaged people Item 1 0.790 0,673 0,891 0,829 
 Item 2 0.862    
 Item 3 0.712    
 Item 4 0.882    
      
Community responsibilities Item 1 0.694 0,566 0,838 0,745 
 Item 2 0.679    
 Item 3 0.864    
 Item 4 0.736    
      
Behavioral Integration Item 1 0.787 0,779 0,934 0,899 
 Item 2 0.909    
 Item 3 0.891    
 Item 4 0.893    
            




 TABLE II 
Mean, Standard Deviations and Correlations    
 Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Frequency of Board Meetings 6.05 3.06 1           
2. Board Size 8.47 4.55 0.12† 1         
3. Firm Age 26 17 0,08 0.24*** 1        
4. Firm Size  181 521 0.04 0.12 0.24*** 1       
5. Board Stakeholder Knowledge 4.02 1.28 -0.10 -0.24*** -0.06 -0.04 1      
6. Behavioral integration 5.74 0.97 0.23*** -0.19** 0.09 -0.00 0.06 1     
7. Board Service Performance  4.50 1.29 0.18** -0.19** 0.00 0.02 0.39*** 0.52*** 1    
8. Hiring disadvantaged people 4.88 1.51 -0.02 -0.12† -0.20** -0.05 0.11 0.16* .012 1   
9. Community responsibilities  4.87 1.32 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.12† -0.02 0.15* 1  
10. Financial performance 0.03 0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.13† 0.01 -0.04 0.13 -0.02 1 
Note. 





              








Results Structural model 
  Model 1 (without moderator) Model 2 (with moderator) 
   
95% 
bootstrapped 






 coefficiënt p value 2.5% 97.5% 
Path 
 coefficiënt p value 2.5% 97.5% 
          
Control variables          
boardmeetings -> board service performance 0.238 0.000 0.105 0.358 0.226 0.000 0.095 0.344 
boardsize -> board service performance -0.121 0.057 -0.245 0.005 -0.101 0.118 -0.228 0.025 
size -> board service performance -0.099 0.119 -0.223 0.026 -0.092 0.140 -0.211 0.033 
size -> community responsibilities 0.017 0.862 -0.186 0.190 0.043 0.696 -0.203 0.238 
size -> hiring disadvantaged people 0.022 0.783 -0.135 0.184 0.022 0.779 -0.133 0.175 
size -> financial performance 0.074 0.323 -0.075 0.224 0.074 0.333 -0.075 0.227 
Age -> board service performance 0.133 0.057 -0.003 0.270 0.141 0.045 0.007 0.279 
Age -> community responsibilities 0.111 0.233 -0.087 0.276 0.120 0.199 -0.088 0.281 
Age -> hiring disadvantaged people -0.176 0.028 -0.332 -0.019 -0.176 0.028 -0.333 -0.015 
Age -> financial performance 0.140 0.094 -0.027 0.300 0.140 0.097 -0.031 0.302 
Main variables          
behavioral Integration -> board service performance     -0.042 0.606 -0.185 0.123 
board stakeholder knowledge -> board service performance 0.433 0.000 0.322 0.555 0.434 0.000 0.322 0.552 
moderating Effect -> board service performance     0.174 0.057 0.044 0.377 
board service performance -> community responsibilities -0.097 0.381 -0.281 0.145 -0.052 0.725 -0.290 0.241 
board service performance -> hiring disadvantaged people 0.154 0.046 0.001 0.309 0.155 0.044 0.003 0.308 
board service performance -> financial performance 0.050 0.515 -0.096 0.202 0.049 0.524 -0.101 0.200 





FIGURE  2 
Moderating effect of behavioral integration on the relationship between board stakeholder 
knowledge and board service performance  
 
 
